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CATEGORY SIGNALING AND REPUTATION
GIACOMO NEGRO, MICHAEL T. HANNAN, AND MAGALI FASSIOTTO
Abstract. We propose that category membership can operate as a col-
lective market signal for quality when low-quality producers face higher
costs of gaining membership. The strength of membership as a collective
signal increases with the sharpness of the category boundary, or contrast.
Our empirical study focuses on biodynamic and organic viticulture in
Alsace.
1. Introduction
The curious success of biodynamic winemaking in Alsace provides an oppor-
tunity to gain some new and general insight about how categories structure
markets. Many renowned wineries in the region follow the very unconven-
tional biodynamic approach, proposed by the Austrian polymath Rudolph
Steiner in a series of lectures in 1924. His holistic approach to farming builds
on principles involving cosmic forces that outsiders find bizarre. His claim
that “gnomes, undines, sylphs and fire spirits are actively involved in plant
growth” (Steiner, 2003, 158) gives the flavor of this approach. Given its ec-
centricity and the lack of an obvious link with making high-quality wines, we
wondered why membership in the biodynamic category has gained a favor-
able reception from critics and consumers, and whether (and how) audiences
have come to interpret biodynamics as a signal of quality.
Attempting to answer these questions led us to consider that processes of
market signaling might operate at the category level. According to theories
of market signaling, some agents can signal their otherwise hard-to-observe
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quality and the audience can use the signal as a screening mechanism. For
an action to be a signal, the cost of producing the signal must decrease with
increases in the agent’s quality. Then a separating equilibrium can result
where those who provide the signal have higher average quality (Spence,
1974). We argue that membership in sharply bounded categories can work
parallel to individual market signals.
Noise can affect the interpretability of signals. For example labels of prove-
nance can be faked or confused with others; producers can claim to use
practices that they do not. Such noise will diminish the efficiency of signals
tied to individual producers. We propose that category signals can identify
otherwise-unobservable differences in quality in such settings. This requires
that (1) low-quality producers find it more costly to gain category member-
ship and (2) the category has sharp boundaries, high contrast in technical
terms.
Signaling theories do not explicitly address why certain actions or claims
come to be interpreted as signals. All that matters is that the signal, however
chosen, separates high- and low-quality producers in equilibrium. A focus on
categories provides some analytic leverage on this issue. It seems likely that
a history of high average level of quality of the producers whose performances
are observed increases the likelihood that membership in the category gets
taken as a signal of superior capability by the audience. In other words,
category membership emerges as a signal similarly to how groups develop
reputations (Tirole, 1996). Indeed we shift the emphasis from the producer
to the audience. Instead of focusing on the producer’s choice to send a signal,
we emphasize the audience’s “discovery” of a signal.
To preview our analysis of Alsatian winemaking, we focus on two un-
conventional and categorically coded approaches to viticulture—organic and
biodynamic. We argue that conformity to the codes for these categories re-
quires higher capability and commitment (and higher costs of production)
than conventional winemaking. Membership in either category therefore
qualifies as a market signal of quality.
However, the biodynamic category arguably has sharper boundaries (higher
contrast) than organic winemaking for two reasons. First, its bizarre prac-
tices (e.g., using cow horns and red-deer bladders to cure manure and yarrow
blossoms in sprays for vineyards and compost) and the additional commit-
ment these practices represent make biodynamicists stand out. Second, the
organic category has a fuzzy boundary due to the perceived overlap with
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another proto-category, “sustainable,” whose adherents claim to be “nearly
organic.” This confusion lowers the contrast of the organic—but not the
biodynamic—category. This leads us to think that membership in biody-
namics sends a stronger market signal because of its high categorical con-
trast.
Our first analysis shows that higher-quality Alsatian wineries have higher
hazards of becoming biodynamic but not organic. This suggests a reputa-
tional basis for the emergence of a category signal for the biodynamic cat-
egory but not the organic one. Then, we document two market outcomes:
critics’ ratings and retail prices. Ratings by international critics tasting blind
(who do not know the identity of the producer or its categorical affiliations)
are significantly more positive for wineries after they join either the biody-
namic or organic category than before. A parallel analysis finds that ratings
by prominent French critics who do know the producer’s identity favor bio-
dynamic over conventional wines but not so for organic wines. Wineries
also benefit from certifying their affiliation to the biodynamic category. A
final analysis of the American retail market similarly indicates price advan-
tages for wineries using unconventional practices. Prices also increase with
higher critics’ ratings and certification. Interestingly, these effects do not
seem enough to also increase profitability.
2. Theory
Market Signals. Offerings and producers in markets generally differ in
quality. Information about quality tends to be asymmetric: a job applicant,
a loan seeker, and a used-car seller tend to know more than the prospective
employer, lender, and buyer. In general, both high-quality producers and
audience members benefit from transmission of reliable information about
quality. The benefits consist of material advantages, e.g., higher prices. In-
trinsic motivations also matter. For example, producers might take personal
pride in the recognition of their offering as high quality.
Those possessing high quality face the problem of their actions being mim-
icked or faked. How can they convince the audience of their capability? This
is where market signals come in. The signaling mechanism can address infor-
mation asymmetry by yielding equilibria in which only high-quality produc-
ers find it worthwhile to invest in the signal. This requires that producing
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the signal is less costly for highly capable producers.1 In Spence’s job-market
model, prospective employees can demonstrate their (potential) productivity
by investing in education, which those of low potential find more costly (re-
quiring more effort). Applications of market signaling consider investments
made by individual agents: in economics, Spence (1973a,b, 1974); in biology,
Zahavi (1975) and Grafen (1990); in political science, Jervis (1970), and in
sociology Gambetta (2009).2
Many markets for consumer goods, including food and clothing, pose chal-
lenges to interpreting market signals. For instance, labels that denote geo-
graphical provenance or special inputs can be imitated. Such fakery calls into
question the authenticity of any producer in the market, which weakens the
connection between quality and observable characteristics. Individual sig-
nals will lose their diagnostic power and the resulting equilibrium will be a
so-called pooling equilibrium (with mixes of high- and low-quality producers
lumped together) rather than a separating one.3
In some cases, category signals—collective signals associated with cat-
egory membership—can still solve the problem of information asymmetry
in the face of noise. The advantage of category signals comes partly from
the fact that multiple producers can display the signal. Political scientists
make this argument about the efficiency of investing in industry associations
for political action by individual firms; see, for example, Lohmann (1993).
Moreover, because multiple producers use the same sign, collective signaling
enhances interpretability. The audience likely trusts conformity to a cate-
gory more than idiosyncratic individual observables. For example, collective
enforcement has more credibility than individual monitoring over one’s own
actions.4 Sociological and anthropological accounts have long maintained
1A signal does not need to but can be productive in the sense that adopting the signal
improves performance. For a productive signal to operate effectively, the increase in
productivity must be less than the cost of acquiring the signal (Spence, 1974).
2Our argument relates more directly to Spence’s model than to others, particularly
Podolny’s 1993 status-signal model. Spence begins with quality differentials and derives
signals; Podolny begins with the status signal and derives differences in quality.
3This is the reason why many labels are legally protected in the global market. Take, for
example, the use of the label “Champagne.” While originally a term reserved for a style
of wine, in order to avoid questions of fakery, the label is now legally protected in most
markets to include only producers from the Champagne region of France.
4Take a more specific example, the signal of compliance to fair-labor standards in the
apparel industry. Nike and Reebok invested in factory standards in Indonesia that were
superior to the local legal requirements. They hired auditors of the working conditions in
their plants, but the audits were not seen as credible. The companies gained credibility
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that costly signs of group membership are correlated with intra-group coop-
eration and limited free-riding behavior.
Category Contrast. Properties of categories likely shape the possibility
that a categorical signal emerges and persists. In our interpretation, the
matter lies in the hands of the audience and any number of properties might
matter in any particular situation. Some possibilities are likely accidental
and not subject to prediction. We narrow our focus to one that has proven
to have predictive value: the sharpness of the category boundary.
The line of theory we follow ties the sharpness of the boundary of a cat-
egory to contrast. High contrast means that category membership is nearly
crisp: producers tend to be fully in or out. For example, brewpubs have
higher contrast than microbrewers in the beer industry due to storefront lo-
cation and visibility of the production equipment to the public. One can
hardly mistake them for some other kind of brewery or business (Carroll and
Swaminathan, 2000). More abstractly, contrast is defined as the average
grade of membership in the category of the producers to which the audience
applies a category label.
High contrast increases the likelihood that audience members use simi-
lar interpretive schemas for a category (Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2007).
When such agreement obtains, audience members will generally find that the
producers to which others have assigned the label will also have observable
features that fit their understandings of the category. Under such conditions,
conformity to category schemas by those bearing the category label becomes
accepted as natural, or taken for granted.
We suggest that categories with high taken-for-grantedness can support
strong category signals. Category members will have highly similar observ-
able characteristics and audience members will apply the label in very similar
ways. When one member applies the label to a producer, then others will
also likely treat it as satisfying the category code (Hsu, Hannan, and Pólos,
2011). The core of our argument is that, if membership in a category serves
as a market signal of quality, then the strength of this signal increases with
the category’s contrast.
Category Reputation. Models of signaling explain how signals can op-
erate to separate agents of different quality. But the knowledge of what
by joining a coalition of other manufacturers, activists, and labor groups, which organized
the audits.
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sending and receiving a message means plays a critical role also (Gambetta,
2009). These are matters more of interpretation than intention. Agents need
not know that their actions transmit a signal for the signaling argument to
hold. How do certain messages become interpreted as collective signals of
quality?
Models of collective reputation propose one answer (Tirole, 1996; Levin,
2009). These models too assume imperfect observability of current and past
individual behavior and quality, which introduces noise in the screening pro-
cess of products or workers by buyers or employers. In such situations,
individual reputations have limited value. However, individual agents can
also belong to collective entities, to social groups.
The current quality of a group is partially observable over the market
interface. In the models of Tirole (1996) and Levin (2009) the quality of a
group is simply the average quality of its members. The group’s past quality,
which Tirole defined as the “track record” of past generations of members, is
its collective reputation. Individual members affiliate with a group based on
the advantages linked to its collective reputation. A bad reputation creates
incentives for members to cut corners, because high quality would not be
rewarded. Conversely, a good reputation produces incentives for striving for
quality. When membership and past track record of the group are known,
collective reputation conveys information about the average current quality
of individual members.
The assessment of individual quality in the presence of collective rep-
utations builds on the group’s history. The reputation developed by group
members influences individual behavior and predicts future behavior reliably.
Of course, groups can include opportunists. But since individual advantages
depend on collective reputation, groups with good reputations sustain disci-
pline and opportunists tend to behave honestly or be excluded.
In the context of market categories, these models suggest that categories
with high contrast successfully sustain reputations for high quality. Audience
members can more easily come to agreement about meaning in the high-
contrast case, as we discussed above. Such agreement facilitates monitoring
and sanctioning of fakery. Monitoring becomes easier because high contrast
means fewer producers have partial memberships of middling value; there is
less gray area. Sanctioning is easier because what one audience member finds
troubling will also trouble others when the audience agrees about meaning.
As we describe below, membership in a high-contrast category visibly in-
dicates a group of producers known for attaching great importance to the
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value of input factors and for being attentive to the conditions in which prod-
ucts are made. Such past investments shape expectations of quality (Kreps
and Spence, 1985). In this fashion, track records can affect the emergence
of membership in a high-contrast category as a signal of quality.
Category memberships thus operate as common signatures in the producer-
audience interface (Bacharach and Gambetta, 2001). Categories with gener-
ally accepted representations among audience members (schemas) can serve
to fill in missing quality information in a market like wine, with its pro-
nounced information asymmetry (Nelson, 1970). Membership in a category
can therefore provide relatively sticky information about quality that sub-
stitutes for continuous updates of beliefs based on observation of market
interactions.
The general principle of market signaling must apply for category mem-
bership to serve as a market signal: it must be more costly for producers of
inferior quality to gain recognition as a category member. Additionally, the
strength of a category signal presumably depends on the sharp boundary of
the category: its contrast.
3. Biodynamic and Organic Winemaking in Alsace
We now explore the potential analytic value of the notion of category sig-
naling by delving into the case of Alsatian winemaking. Biodynamic and
organic practices have spread rapidly in the region of Alsace, in the north-
east of France. In 1980, only one winery in the region was biodynamic, and
one was organic. By 2010 more than half of the 142 wineries in our data
had joined one of these categories (30 biodynamic and 44 organic). Many
wineries deemed by experts to be among the best have joined the organic
and biodynamic categories. Of the producers rated in 2008 as “exceptional”
by influential expert Robert Parker, six are biodynamic and two are organic;
of the ten rated as “excellent,” five are biodynamic and three are organic.
We find this development interesting because adhering to biodynamics and
organics increases production costs considerably. It was not clear that the
market would pay a premium for these wines or indeed if they would have
more than a fringe market.
The biodynamic and organic categories are viewed as organized sets of
practices and have rules of conduct; in other words, they have codes. What
are these codes? While organic agriculture has become fairly mainstream,
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Avoid risk of pesticide drifts from neighboring farms
Long-term plan for maintaining soil fertility
Monitoring suitable cleaning measures
Biodynamic only
Philosophical motivation
Observation of lunar and other cosmic rhythms for crop cultivation
Create biodiversity in the field




500 Cow manure buried in cow horns in the soil over winter
501 Ground quartz buried in cow horns in the soil over summer
502 Yarrow flowers buried sheathed in a stag’s bladder
503 German chamomile flowers sheathed in a cow intestine
504 Stinging nettles buried in the soil in summer
505 Oak bark buried sheathed in the skull of a farm animal
506 Dandelion flowers buried sheathed in a cow mesentery
507 Valerian flower juice sprayed over or inserted in the compost
508 Common horsetail made either as a fresh tea or fermented
liquid manure applied to the vines or to the soil
biodynamic production remains more esoteric. The biodynamic code sub-
sumes the organic and goes further. It proposes a unified approach to agri-
culture that relates the ecology of the earth to that of the entire cosmos.
Biodynamics sets itself apart from other agricultural systems, including or-
ganic farming, by its association with the precepts of anthroposophy pro-
posed by Rudolph Steiner in the 1920s. His teachings propose that the farm
is a living organism. Biodynamic farming prescribes the use of certain prac-
tices including use of a set of preparations to promote healthy soil and plant
growth (Steiner, 2003), described in Table 1.
The colorful and mystical practices of biodynamics mark a very strong
turn from the scientific winemaking of the New World. Especially conspicu-
ous is the use of several fermented “preparations” as field sprays and compost
inoculants. These preparations consist of plant parts or extracts treated with
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animal tissues that have been buried in the soil. For instance, the iconic
Preparation 500 is made by filling cow horns with manure from lactating
cows fed with biodynamic grains, burying them in the vineyard on the au-
tumn equinox, and digging them up on the spring equinox. Farmers then
make very diluted liquids by combining about one teaspoon of the cured ma-
nure with about 40–60 liters of water and stirring for one hour in a pattern
that “dynamizes” it. The preparation is then sprayed on the vines in the
descending phase of the moon. (Reliance on astral and lunar calendars for
timing actions in the vineyard and the cellar is a hallmark of this approach.)
Adherents believe that these preparations stimulate soil cycling, promote
healthy plant growth and optimal compost development, and have myriad
other beneficial effects.
A study comparing organic and biodynamic vineyard treatments found
that both improve soil quality over conventional cultivation, but soil pa-
rameters or tissue nutrients do not differ significantly between biodynamic
and organic (Reeve, Carpenter-Boggs, Reganold, McGourty, and McCloskey,
2005). If viticultural science tells us that these methods produce similar
improvements, we reasoned that the romantic, non-rational imagery of bio-
dynamics and its apparatus of precepts could serve as the basis for a very
distinctive identity in the market, which might be valued either positively or
negatively.
Winemaking Practices and Quality. Issues of wine quality arise at least
at two levels. First, there is what might be called abstracted quality. Here
the issues are mainly technical, including: is the taste clean and intense; are
the acids balanced; how much minerality is detected; are flavor and aroma
complex; are there off smells, tastes, or reduction? Then, the next level con-
cerns contextualized quality. Here the issues are more socially embedded and
involve typicality and authenticity. They include whether the wine faithfully
expresses the region’s identity and tradition, the winery’s terroir5, and the
winemaker’s style.
Quality depends on hundreds, perhaps thousands, of decisions that are not
observable to outsiders. These include: how much care was taken in pruning
and canopy management; how much was yield controlled; whether the har-
vest was timed appropriately; whether the grapes were properly sorted; how
5Terroir is a somewhat mystical French notion that refers to the unique combination of
geographical, pedological, and climatic characteristics of a certain land.
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cold soaking was conducted; how fermentation, racking, and filtering pro-
gressed; whether anything (acids, sugar, oak chips or fluids, coloring agents,
and so forth) was added to the product; whether the wine was ultra-filtered
or put through reverse-osmosis.
The producers know these facts; the audience does not. How a wine from
a past vintage tastes can prove a useful guide for the audience to assess
current quality. But, producers change practices all the time in response
to changes in climatic conditions or technical developments. Wine quality
can only be assessed accurately in the act of consumption. This explains
why critics have such importance as well as why information communicated
through market signals has value for foretelling quality of wines and other
experience goods.
Producers’ Views. We conducted semi-structured interviews with vignerons
from 23 wineries in 19 villages in Alsace in 2009 and 2010 from which the
quotes in this section are drawn. The interviews allowed us to better un-
derstand the process of joining the biodynamic and/or organic categories.
Because we knew less about them, we targeted more (14) biodynamic winer-
ies. These interviews were extremely valuable in providing some insight into
the core issues from the producers’ perspective. They also help us under-
stand the applicability of our theoretical argument to the empirical case.
Costs of Category Membership. Organic and biodynamic practices impose
higher costs than those they replaced. Adopting either method rules out the
use of some labor-saving practices (e.g., the use of herbicides as a substitute
for plowing). And, biodynamic production also imposes distinctive practices,
such as spraying with the famous preparations and elaborate procedures of
composting.6
In our fieldwork informants provided some information on this issue (un-
less noted otherwise all quotes come from the field interviews described
above). One, from Wintzenheim, said: “ [W]e earn less money than a con-
ventional winery because we have 20% lower yields. We have 30% more
handwork. In France, it costs a lot of money. So, for me to produce a bot-
tle of wine, it costs at least 50% more. But we cannot charge 50% more.”
(11/20/2009) And a biodynamic winemaker from Turckheim told us:
6Cole’s fieldwork among Oregon wineries suggests that managing biodynamic vineyards
costs 15% more than managing a sustainably farmed property and hiring a consultant can
cost a thousand dollars per visit. Certification is a few hundred dollars, and applicants
also pay a licensing fee of 0.5% on gross sales. Cole notes: “For the same price, organic
certification sounds like a safer bet.” (Cole, 2011, 58)
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“It’s not the organic and biodynamic estates that make the
higher profits, because we have higher costs but the price
of the bottle is not that much more expensive. An organic
or biodynamic wine doesn’t cost 40% or 50% more than a
conventional wine at the same quality level, from the same
area and in the same style. We are maybe less profitable
. . . I employ about seven more people per hectare than the
average in the area . . . for a bottle of wine my labor cost is
several times higher.” (11/17/2009)
The central issue for signaling is whether the cost of the signal is negatively
associated with quality. We think that there are good reasons for thinking
that this is the case here. Both organic and biodynamic category codes bring
viticulture closer to the traditional craft of farming but impose discipline.
Eschewing chemical pesticides requires great attention to the vineyard and
skill in reacting to the appearance of pests. Wine-writer Kramer (2010,
117) argues the case for biodynamics in particular, which requires elaborate
manual procedures and organizing by multiple natural cycles:
“Biodynamic cultivation signals a willingness to pay extreme
attention to vines and wines. Like driving a race car, if you
take your eyes off the road—or in this case a highly vulner-
able vineyard—an irremediable disaster can result. Ask any
farmer: attentiveness is always a good thing . . . biodynamic
processes are a form of discipline, some of which may actu-
ally work, while other practices may be more emotionally and
psychologically sustaining to the practitioner than practical
to the plant or wine.”
Adopting Biodynamic and Organic Practices. We learned that the initial
turn to biodynamic and organic production stemmed from a mix of inter-
twined reasons including making higher-quality wines that also better reflect
the terroir and protecting the environment. Arguably, the experience of
these dedicated producers provided a plausible connection between uncon-
ventional practices and quality.
Many winemakers observed that chemical herbicides and pesticides had
killed organic life in the soil and had diminished wine quality. For instance,
a winemaker in Turckheim focusing on the abstracted dimension said:
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“Chemical products and technology were a real miracle. They
helped the growers a lot in reducing the amount of heavy-
duty, physical work. It made it a lot easier, allowed the
growers to do more vineyard stuff, so to be more produc-
tive, to lower the cost of a bottle of wine. Growers like my
father were told ‘this is new, it’s modern, it works, it doesn’t
pollute, it’s clean,’ all the stuff you want to hear. It took
years to realize that—Oh it was supposed to help me, but, in
fact, I’m getting more and more diseases and more problems,
and my soil has lost its fertility.” (11/17/2009)
Many also suspected that the degradation of the vineyards had lowered
the quality of the wine. For instance, a vintner in Beblenheim recalled:
“I was thinking we were wrong—we should turn to a better
agriculture. We were destroying what is the foundation of
everything. I saw some vineyards, tasted some wines, and
I thought what could help me get more harmonious wines,
more complex wines? The wines we were producing before
sold nicely, they had good reviews from Parker. But I found
that I liked less and less what I was producing.” (12/8/2010)
Others told us that they started to notice off-aromas in the wine, increasing
heaviness, less minerality, and the loss of the ability of the wines to age
properly.
The theme of contextualized quality as a motivation for moving away
from conventional practices also comes through strongly in our interviews,
especially with biodynamic wineries. A vintner from Wintzenheim said:
“. . .my objective is not to be biodynamic . . . [but] to make the best wine
from the place, from our soils, from our terroir. And the icing on the cake
is that it’s biodynamic . . . because [this is] the more natural way to reach
this goal.” (11/20/2009) Another from Ammerschwihr agreed: “We have a
great terroir . . . For us biodynamics . . . really allows the terroir to express
itself much better in the wine.” (11/18/2009) And one from Epfig said:
“Terroir is the key for great wines. There is no great wine
without terroir . . . that [biodynamics improves the expression
of terroir ] is why you move to biodynamics because you are
convinced, because you have an environmental consciousness,
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but also you can come to biodynamics without any environ-
mental consciousness because biodynamics increases terroir
in taste.” (11/19/2009)
Contrasts of Biodynamic and Organic Categories. Many consider the prac-
tices of biodynamic viticulture bizarre, which makes them highly salient. A
winemaker from Wintzenheim, who joined biodynamics in 1996, said that
many scoffed at these methods: “Early on, everyone was laughing at us. They
were only waiting for us to have problems, to lose a harvest. But I knew
what I was doing. I was sure. But these were hard times.” (11/17/2009)
Another said: “A neighbor. . . told me in Alsatian dialect, ‘at your place, you
really have grass for the rabbit.’ I mean, for him it was dirty because you
had plants, herbs, and flowers in the vineyard.” (11/20/2009)
A leader in the biodynamic movement told us his reaction to a lecture by
François Bouchet (who influenced many who converted to biodynamics): “I
thought that’s a fantastic thing. It’s crazy, it sounds absolutely mad, but it
was also quite fascinating and interesting.” (11/17/2009) It is precisely the
unusual quality of its practices that makes this category stand out, that gives
it high contrast. Adhering to a category that demands use of bizarre prac-
tices and incurs ridicule, in addition to greater amounts of time investment,
plausibly signals a commitment to quality.
Relatedly, the requirement of these practices means that organic produc-
tion can represent one step along the way to becoming biodynamic. As a
result, the movement of higher quality producers to biodynamic from or-
ganic will further lower the contrast of the organic category as biodynamic
production, with its added practices and requirements, becomes regarded as
the end goal. Second, the contrast of “organic” is lowered by its perceived
overlap with lutte raisonnée (loosely, the reasoned struggle), which might be
called sustainable farming. This competing code specifies “minimal” use of
herbicides and pesticides. In Alsatian winemaking, this alternative is pro-
mulgated by an association called Tyflo, which encourages: “. . . production of
economically-viable high-quality grapes, giving priority to ecologically sound
methods. . . in order to preserve the environment and human health” (Tyflo,
2011).
Theories of market signaling suggest that low-quality producers have an
incentive to imitate a market signal (Spence, 2002). Lutte raisonnée appears
to us to imitate the signals of higher quality in the market. However, this
imitation muddies the contrast of the organic signal. The organic producers
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face a problem: the practitioners of lutte raisonnée claim to be nearly organic.
Their presence on the scene, as well as the attempts by their industry asso-
ciation to legitimate their “nearly organic” character, blurs the boundaries
of the organic category but, due to its sharper boundaries, not the biody-
namic one. Indeed “organic” and “sustainable” are often used interchangeably
blurring distinctions between these labels (Ministère de l’Agriculture, 2011;
European Commission, 2012).
The claim to be nearly organic incites strong reactions towards lutte
raisonnée. For instance, the director of a large organic producer in Riquewihr
said: “I’ve never met somebody who’s not at least raisonnée. Because if you
are not, you are really a dirty bastard!” (11/19/2009) A biodyamicist from
Epfig also objected: “Lutte raisonnée—it’s a big lie. It’s an invention from
the classic agriculture to give a smoke screen about the real practice and to
produce some confusion with real organic practice.” (11/19/2009) Another
from Pfaffenheim, said: “ We should call it pollution raisonnée. The solution
was to say we do lutte raisonnée—they are organic but we are raisonnée,
it’s almost like organic farming. That’s not true! It has nothing to do with
organic farming.” (12/9/2010)
The arguments detailed above about category contrast lead us to expect
that membership in the biodynamic category sends a stronger signal of qual-
ity than membership in the organic category in the Alsatian context. We
conduct empirical analyses to see whether this is the case once appropriate
controls for confounding influences are made. To be clear, we observed the
main patterns in the average ratings by category before building models. The
pattern suggested to us that a signaling interpretation might be warranted.
This means that we cannot perform an independent test of the implications
of the argument. At best, our empirical work speaks to the plausibility of
the theoretical story.
4. Research Design
In addition to the qualitative data from in-person interviews described in
the previous section, our quantitative data come from three archival sources
and a phone survey.
The first archival source is Robert Parker’s Wine Buyer’s Guide. Parker
is widely regarded as the world’s most influential wine expert (Hadj Ali,
Lecocq, and Visser, 2008). The guide compiles scores for wineries on a
five-star scale, where five stars indicate the highest rating, producers that
CATEGORY SIGNALING AND REPUTATION 15
“make the greatest wine of their viticultural region, and they are remarkably
consistent and reliable even in mediocre and poor vintages” (Parker 1993,
8). We constructed a time series of ratings from the seven editions of the
guide.7 Because of its focus on wineries of high quality, we use this source
to understand generalized winery quality. Our main ratings analyses focus
on the next two archival sources.
The second archival source is the U.S. publication Wine Spectator, ar-
guably the most influential wine guide internationally. Its online database
contains tasting notes for Alsatian wines from the issues of February 1987
through August 2010. WS practices blind tasting: its tasters and editors do
not know who made the wine or how much it costs when they assign a score,
but they do know some of the context including the vintage, appellation, and
grape variety. Each editor generally covers the same wine regions from year
to year, allowing lead tasters to develop expertise in a region. Other tasters
might participate in blind tastings to help confirm impressions. However,
the lead taster always has the final say.
The third source is Le Guide de Vins de France, curated by Gault et Mil-
lau, a sister publication to the well-known review of restaurants in France.
Starting in 1984, GM published special bulletins with general notes on lead-
ing wineries and price information for a few selected wines, but no compre-
hensive ratings. These earlier editions provide us with winery-level infor-
mation, particularly price levels and the number of bottles produced. From
the 2003 edition, the guide provides comprehensive wine ratings. We coded
label-level information in this and subsequent yearly editions through 2010.
The GM guide has considerable influence in France. Wineries often highlight
the ratings received from the guide in the “pressrooms” on their websites.
Beginning with the 2007 edition, GM tells about the viticultural practices
of interest. However, we lacked such data for earlier periods. Accordingly,
we conducted a telephone survey in 2010 with informants from all the winer-
ies with wine ratings in either guides, a total of 155 wineries. We asked
7We record the number of stars assigned to wineries for the vintages covered by the guides
as follows: First edition (1988): 1981, 1982, 1983; Second edition (1990): 1984, 1985, 1986;
Third edition (1993): 1988, 1989, 1990; Fourth edition (1995): 1991, 1992, 1993; Fifth
edition (1999): 1994, 1995, 1996; Sixth edition (2002): 1998, 1999, 2000; Seventh edition
(2008): 2003, 2004, 2005. Values for four intervening years (1987, 1997, 2001, and 2002)
were linearly interpolated from the years immediately preceding and following. At the
time of writing, Parker had not yet published an eighth edition; accordingly, we carried
forward the ratings from the 2008 edition. The number of wineries rated grows unevenly
over time from 38 in 1988 to 60 in 2008, reaching a maximum of 66 in the 1999 edition.
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about viticultural practice, particularly biodynamics and organics, as well
as certification in these categories. We obtained such data for 142 of the 155
wineries. Our informants also indicated when they began bottling, which
we use to determine the time at risk of conversion. We used these data
to code memberships in the two non-conventional categories. We code the
distinction between organic and biodynamic production as mutually exclu-
sive: “organic” means “organic-but-not-biodynamic” throughout. Because
of the inherent ambiguity in adherence to sustainable, or lutte raisonnée,
practices (with several producers claiming adherence and no strict method
to ascertain these claims), we do not try to distinguish membership in the
“sustainable” camp. These producers are part of the “conventional” category
in all analyses.
When we analyze the hazards of becoming biodynamic or organic as a
function of a winery’s quality, we use three indicators of quality. The first
measures the quality of resource endowments by the number of grand cru,
the highest quality classification for a vineyard, in the wineries portfolio. The
other measures are experts’ assessments of the overall quality of a winery’s
products. One is Parker’s overall ratings of wineries, described above. But,
Parker reviews wines openly, and these ratings likely reflect some combina-
tion of quality and status. As an alternative, we use the average of WS’s
blind ratings of a winery’s products by vintage.
When we seek to understand how critics and consumer audiences respond
to category signals, we follow previous studies and characterize such response
in terms of ratings assigned by specialized critics and of prices in retail
markets (Shrum, 1991; Hsu, Hannan, and Koçak, 2009; Kovács and Hannan,
2010).
We first examine ratings based on WS’s blind tastings, where category
signals remain hidden. Members of the unconventional categories can receive
better evaluations in these tastings only to the extent that they put more
discipline into their work, i.e., the investment in the signal is productive.
One category will receive higher ratings than another only if its practices
improve on the other’s.
We also examine ratings from GM’s non-blind tastings. Here, the taster
knows the identity of the producer but not the wine’s price. When the
evaluator knows producers’ identities, the category schemas enter directly in
evaluations. One such schema is what wine journalist Kramer (2010, 39) calls
site deference: “less about where great wines come from and more how they
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are from.” Knowledge of the context of production can shape perceptions
of a wine as different. This is where biodynamics stands out more sharply
due to the high contrast owing to the philosophical framework, the odd
practices, and the potential confusion of the boundary of organic production
created by the claims of the “sustainable” producers. Our argument implies
that biodynamic wines will receive better ratings than organic wines when
the evaluator knows the producer’s identity. Arguably, the blind tastings
incorporate the abstracted quality dimension we described above. The non-
blind tastings can also feature the contextualized dimension more explicitly.
The GM guide presumes that its audience cares about the categories we
are studying. It categorizes wineries as conventional, organic, or biody-
namic. Given our emphasis on the distinctiveness of biodynamics, we find
it interesting that it chose to symbolize organic wine with a generic leaf and
biodynamic wine with a more distinctive crescent moon.
We treat the difference in tasting method as providing a unique opportu-
nity to distinguish more clearly the effects of category memberships. Infer-
ence depends on the counter-factual assumption that blind tastings by GM
would provide the same patterns of association as recorded from the blind
WS ratings. Clearly we cannot verify that this is the case; and our conclu-
sions are therefore conditional on this assumption. We face the extremely
common (but seldom acknowledged) situation in which only replication can
validate our analytic strategy.
We also examine retail prices in the American market using WS data.
Categorical signals can affect prices in two ways, directly via audiences’
interpretations of the categories and indirectly via critical evaluations. Con-
sumers have less domain knowledge than specialized critics. In the wine
world, over 100,000 different labels compete in the marketplace. Because
clear and simple information has great value for consumers, signaling ought
to operate powerfully.
5. Results
Quality and Category Membership. How does quality affect the choice
to adopt biodynamic or organic practices? We address this question by
estimating the effect of a variety of measures of winery quality on the hazard
of joining the two categories during the period ranging from 1981, the first
year of available winery scores from Parker, through 2010.8
8Only one winery started using biodynamic methods before the start of the study period
(in 1969) and one started using organic methods before the start of the study period (in
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We use lagged values of the three measures of each winery’s quality dis-
cussed in the previous section: number of grand crus, Parker’s ratings, and
WS ratings.9 We control for the size of the operation, measured as the num-
ber of bottles produced (in thousands) using data from the GM and WS
and the telephone survey, and calendar year (set to zero in 1981), which
controls for time effects including trends in the wine market. We include a
left-censoring dummy equal to one for wineries in operation in 1981. The
model analyzing the hazard of joining the biodynamic category includes a
control for whether the winery had already become organic (six had done
so); no winery moved the other way.
The strong and consistent finding is that the hazard of adopting biody-
namics increases with winery quality (Table 2, columns 1–3). The effect of
quality on the biodynamic hazard is positive and statistically significant for
all three measures. In contrast, the effects of winery quality on the hazard
of joining the organic category are negative but not statistically significant
(Table 2, columns 4–6). So on average the biodynamic wineries had high
quality when they joined, but this was not the case for the organic category.
This initial difference in average levels of pre-membership quality suggests
a reputational basis for the biodynamic category signal. The difference in
prior quality made membership in the biodynamic category more likely to
become a category signal than membership in the organic category, issues of
contrast aside. This makes it imperative that we control for track records
of quality in analyzing the effects of category membership on ratings and
prices.
Effects on Critical Evaluations: Levels. Next we analyze the ratings
assigned to wines by GM and WS for the vintages from 1981 through 2008
(the most recent vintage covered by the publications at the time of writing).
The analysis includes ratings of all dry white wines and excludes sparkling
wines and red wines because they differ substantially in production processes
1970). We excluded both from the analysis of changes in categorical membership. Our
informants suggested to us that these early conversions were somewhat unusual. The
very first biodynamicist in the region was said to have converted because he had been
poisoned by pesticides. One vintner in Pfaffenheim recalled “he was blind for a week. He
couldn’t see anything and so he said to himself, ‘I will no longer work with such products’.”
(12/09/2010)
9In additional analyses, we included shared frailties in the same model specifications to
correct for unobserved winery characteristics. The patterns we found are similar to those
reported, while the frailty parameters did not reach statistical significance. For ease of
interpretation we present estimates without such corrections.
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and only a small fraction of the high-quality producers make them. The
dataset generated from the two publications comprises 4,715 ratings from
GM and 3,775 ratings from WS. The dependent variable is the critical rating
of a wine on a 100-point scale.10
The controls include dichotomous variables that identify wines made from
old vines, vieilles vignes (VV), and vendange tardive (VT) or selection grains
nobles (SGN) wines, two types of late-harvest wine. We include the lagged
star rating in Robert Parker’s guide to measure a winery’s vintage-to-vintage
variation in quality and status. Alternatively, we include lagged scores in WS
and GM ratings to control for variation at the level of the specific wine. All
specifications also include a linear time trend and fixed effects for vintages, as
well as for the grape varieties from which Alsatian white wines can be made,
and for each of the 51 grand crus, the sites judged by the French authorities
as producing exceptional wines. Finally, we include the predicted hazards
of becoming biodynamic and organic obtained from the hazard analysis to
address endogeneity concerns for the time-varying propensity to commit to
unconventional methods. Thus we control for various forms of heterogeneity
among wines ands wineries.
Category Signals. We take advantage of the difference in the method of eval-
uation used by the two sources to address two questions. First, are the
categories productive? That is, do category members receive different eval-
uations on average from those who practice conventional winemaking when
the evaluator does not know either the identity of the producer or its cate-
gorical membership? Second, do the results of non-blind tastings and blind
tasting diverge as our argument suggests, that the returns in ratings are
substantially higher for biodynamics than for organics in non-blind tastings
as compared with blind tastings?
We explore the productivity question by analyzing the (blind) WS rat-
ings. In both analyses we control for persistent differences stemming from
endowments and winemakers’ skills in analyzing ratings by examining only
within-winery variation over vintages. That is, we use fixed-effects at the
winery level. This lets us examine the effects of changes in practices; we
10WS used a 100-point scale throughout. GM used a 100-point scale until 2007, then
switched to a 20-point scale. For comparability we converted the latter to the 100-point
scale. The median score is 87 for both GM and WS, and the fraction in the upper range
is similar: the top ten percent of wines receive a score of 90 or higher in GM and 91 or
higher in WS. The publications differ somewhat in the lower range distribution: the value
of the first decile in the GM ratings is 73 and 80 in WS.
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compare a producer’s ratings after joining biodynamics or organics to its
ratings before.
We see in the estimates of column 1 in Table 3 that WS ratings rise
significantly after a winery becomes either biodynamic or organic. As one
would expect, formal certification in either category does not matter in the
blind evaluations (column 2 in Table 3). We cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the effects of the two category memberships are equal (X2 = 0.13, p =
0.72 with 1 df). Adopting the practices consistent with either category is
productive—improves quality, but apparently not differently so.
Overall, this pattern conforms to the notion that membership in both
categories can potentially serve as a categorical signal of quality. Moreover,
these estimates suggest that critics and consumers do not have a “real” ba-
sis for preferring biodynamic over organic wine, at least according to the
aesthetics of the WS tasters.
We turn now to our second research question: does category membership
convey a signal of quality? We explore this question by comparing effects of
the category memberships on the (open) GM ratings and the blind WS rat-
ings. That is, we compare the effects of categorical memberships in columns
1 and 3 (and 2 and 4) in Table 3. We see that the effect of biodynamic pro-
duction is again positive and significant; indeed the magnitude of this effect
is nearly double that estimated from the WS blind tastings.11 Moreover,
the effect of organic production is much smaller. Indeed, the organic effect
is negative for the GM ratings. We see in column 4 that certified member-
ship in biodynamics seems to amplify the positive effect for this category
for the GM ratings. This pattern agrees with our expectations based on
considerations of category signaling and contrast.
Our argument does not predict that the organic effect would be signifi-
cantly negative in non-blind tastings. Although the effect is not stable in all
analyses in the Discussion section we speculate about what this might mean.
Dynamics. It is natural to wonder whether the effect of converting to either
set of practices remains stable over time. We address this issue by estimat-
ing dynamic models for ratings. We do so by including lagged ratings as
covariates, which converts the specifications we have used to this point to
growth models—see Tuma and Hannan (1984, Part III)). (The lagged rating
11In additional analyses not reported for brevity, we found no evidence that membership
in the biodynamic category has a stronger effect for lower quality members, as would be
the case if there were a simple status spillover mechanism at work.
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Table 3. Effects of category membership on ratings from
blind tastings by Wine Spectator and non-blind tasting by
Gault et Millau (OLS estimates of winery-fixed-effect regres-
sions)
Wine Spectator Gault et Millau
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 87.0∗ 87.0∗ 91.1∗ 90.9∗
(2.35) (2.35) (6.05) (6.04)
Biodynamic producer 0.706∗ 0.732∗ 1.30∗ 1.30∗
(0.232) (0.249) (0.444) (0.444)
Organic producer 0.860∗ 1.148∗ −2.18∗ −2.06∗
(0.410) (0.449) (0.420) (0.423)
Biodynamic certification −0.123 1.83∗
(0.308) (0.594)
Organic certification −1.38 −0.654
(0.826) (0.762)
Parker winery rating −0.018 −0.019 −0.171 −0.170
(0.080) (0.080) (0.103) (0.103)
Old vines (VV) 0.243 0.239 0.131 0.135
(0.353) (0.353) (0.324) (0.323)
Late harvest (VT or SGN) 2.40∗ 2.39∗ 0.667∗ 0.658∗
(0.211) (0.211) (0.226) (0.225)
Year trend 0.011 0.18 −0.538∗ 0.541∗
(0.089) (0.089) (0.223) (0.233)
R2 within 0.279 0.280 0.437 0.439
Number of observations 3775 3775 4715 4715
Notes: ∗p < .05; standard errors (adjusted for clustering on winery) are
in parentheses. The specifications include predicted hazards of becoming
biodynamic and organic, and fixed-effects for varietal, grand cru, and vintage.
is not available for a wine’s first entry into the data, and so the number of
cases and of wineries drop.)
Here we face another choice on what variation to analyze. If we continue
with fixed-effects for wineries, we will learn how ratings change after conver-
sion as compared with before. But the audience is not static. So it seems
more interesting to compare patterns of changes in ratings between those
who change memberships with those who do not. This means analyzing
both within- and between-winery variation. We do so using the method of
CATEGORY SIGNALING AND REPUTATION 23
Table 4. Effects of category membership on changes in crit-
ical ratings (GEE estimates)
Wine Spectator Gault et Millau
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Constant 86.2∗ 85.9∗
(10.7) (39.3)
Biodynamic producer 0.848∗ 1.79∗
(0.210) (0.530)
Organic producer 0.297 −1.13
(0.443) (0.586)
Biodynamic certification 0.028 1.85∗
(0.265) (0.827)
Organic certification −1.39 0.297
(0.744) (1.20)
Wine WS rating 0.136∗
(0.014)
Wine GM rating 0.269∗
(0.020)
Old vines (VV) 0.370 0.126
(0.393) (0.449)
Late harvest (VT or SGN) 2.57∗ 0.203
(0.202) (0.355)
Year trend 0.427 −1.22
(0.405) (1.51)
Wald X2 1592 2182
Number of observations 2413 2557
Number of producers 71 113
Notes: ∗p < .05; robust standard errors are in parentheses. The specifications
include the same fixed effects and covariates as in Table 3.
generalized estimating equations which report average differences adjusted
for values of covariates (including lagged dependent variables).12
Biodynamic membership has a significant positive effect on the change
in WS ratings, but organic membership does not (Table 4, column 1) This
suggests the presence of general and continuing gains in quality from biody-
namics linked to vineyard and cellar management.
For GM ratings (column 2 in Table 4), the effect of biodynamic mem-
bership on change is again positive and significant; but the effect of organic
12This method provides high-quality estimates of average effects that do not depend on
the distribution of the unobservables (Zeger, Liang, and Albert, 1988).
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membership on change is negative and not significant. Moreover, formal
certification as biodynamic amplifies the effect of category membership.
These estimates imply that quality ratings of biodynamic and organic
wines continue to diverge and that the difference will become greater with
the continued use of the two sets of practices. Moreover, some of this pat-
tern appears to arise from category signals, because the positive effect of use
of biodynamics on change in ratings is much larger in open tastings (GM)
than in blind ones (WS). In other words, the strength of the category signal
increases over time. This seems plausible in the context because the confu-
sion effect of the sustainable category has likely intensified as the size of its
membership has grown.13
So the categorical signals differ substantially, as predicted. The critics
usually know the categorical memberships, so the signals work even when
the winery does not seek and receive formal certification. There is some
evidence that getting such certification amplifies the signal for critics.
Effects on Retail Prices. How does category membership affect the gen-
eral audience and the market? We gain some insight on this question by
analyzing retail prices when the wines first appeared on the American mar-
ket. Unlike the critics, the consumer audience likely does not know about
actual practices but can easily learn about certification from widely posted
lists of membership, from wine labels, and from guides such as GM, Ha-
chette, and others. So we expect that certification will matter to American
consumers. Including this analysis on retail prices allows us to understand
the effect of biodynamic and organic practices in the supply and demand
dynamics of the consumer market.
WS collects price information from retailers and producers. We adjusted
nominal prices for inflation dividing them by the consumer price index (1982 =
1). The distribution is skewed to the right so we use the natural log trans-
formation as the dependent variable. The modeling strategy follows closely
that used to analyze critical ratings. One difference is that we add a control
for critical scores obtained from the WS to account for the impact of quality
of the focal wine on prices. Due to missing prices for some wines, the final
dataset covers 3,545 wines from 96 wineries.
13Tyflo began in 1997 with 20 members; the membership had grown to 71 in 2012 (Tyflo,
2011).
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Table 5. Effects of category membership on (log) retail
prices (GEE estimates)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Constant 0.922 0.600
(0.678) (0.694)
Biodynamic producer 0.082∗ 0.067∗
(0.013) (0.014)






WS rating of focal wine 0.025∗ 0.025∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Parker winery rating 0.041∗ 0.040∗
(0.005) (0.05)
Old vines (VV) 0.136∗ 0.137∗
(0.020) (0.021)
Late harvest (VT or SGN) 0.673∗ 0.671∗
(0.012) (0.012)
Year trend −0.030 −0.017
(0.026) (0.026)
Wald X2 15904 15480
Number of observations 3545 3545
Number of producers 96 96
Notes: ∗p < .05; robust standard errors are in parentheses. The specifications
include the same fixed effects and covariates as in Table 3.
Biodynamic and organic wines garner higher prices than conventional
wines, net of the effect of WS ratings (column 1 in Table 5). The effects
of the two memberships are nearly equal.
Formal certification also affects prices significantly, positively for biody-
namic and negatively for organic wines in the American market (see also
Delmas and Grant (2011)). Given that the clearest signal of membership
in these categories comes from formal certification, this pair of results also
supports our interpretation of the situation. The stronger signal comes from
membership in the category with higher contrast. The price regressions
control for Parker’s winery ratings and the WS rating of each wine. The
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estimates indicate that the status accorded to a winery by Parker signifi-
cantly increases prices in the U.S. market, as does quality measured in blind
ratings. Again, the category effects hold net of these factors.
The estimated effect of biodynamic membership (Table 5, column 1) im-
plies that the expected retail prices of biodynamic wines rise 8% after con-
version. Taking account of the indirect effect on prices through the effect on
ratings, the combined effect implies an increase of roughly 11%. The anecdo-
tal evidence we collected suggests that conformity to the biodynamic codes
increases a winery’s operational costs by at least 20%. The increase in prices
barely goes to repay the associated higher costs of producing the categorical
signal. Consistent with what our informants said, biodynamic practice likely
reduces profits at least in the short run.14 We suggested that winemakers
might value long-term gains in productivity, sustainability, and/or emotional
benefits, which are not reflected in current prices.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
We began with an empirical puzzle: many highly regarded Alsatian winemak-
ers broke ranks with the highly technicized modern approach to winemaking
and adopted the seemingly irrational practices of biodynamics without ap-
pearing to be met with a negative reaction in the market. Our effort to
explain the pattern led us to think of category memberships operating as
market signals. This conceptualization requires attention both to costs of
membership and to category boundaries. Theories of market signals empha-
size that signals provide information about quality (in equilibrium) when
the costs of producing the signal fall with the producer’s quality. When the
signal comes from membership in a social category, the strength of the signal
increases with the contrast of the category.
We think that the conditions for category signaling hold in Alsatian wine-
making. Biodynamic and organic methods are costly, but more costly (and
risky) for less capable wineries. However, the biodynamic category has higher
contrast than the organic one due both to its many strange practices and
lack of overlap with the “nearly organic” lutte raisonnée. So biodynamics,
14In markets like these where competing producers sell differentiated products, (1) changes
in prices that are proportionate to changes in costs and (2) stationary demand curves, i.e.,
firms are moving along the same downward sloping demand curve and not switching curves,
result in decreasing profits (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Because the elasticity of demand
exceeds one, revenues as well as profits are lower.
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because of its crisper boundary, sends a stronger positive signal of quality
than organic production.
We find that high-quality wineries join the biodynamic category at higher
rates, but not the organic one. We also find that wines made by biodynamic
wineries receive higher ratings from critics in blind and non-blind tastings.
Formal biodynamic certification increases ratings, but only when the taster
knows the identity of the producer. Organic wines also receive higher scores,
as high as those of biodynamic wines, when producers’ identities are hidden.
But organic wines do not receive higher scores when the evaluator knows the
producer’s identity. In some regressions organic wines even receive signifi-
cantly lower scores than conventional wines. Formal certification as organic
amplifies this negative effect. Finally, wines made by either biodynamic
and organic wineries command higher retail prices in the U.S. retail market,
where category membership has visibility.
Because critics and consumers see high-quality producers move to biody-
namic production in the first place, the subsequent higher quality of biody-
namic producers can operate as a “self-confirming belief”: incoming data in
a feedback loop confirm the quality signal (Spence, 1973a). However, the
difference in reactions to organic wines in blind and open tastings seems
striking, especially given that GM professes a commitment to supporting
“natural wines.” This difference in blind and non-blind reviews for these two
costly categories is interesting precisely because it suggests that the signaling
power of the high-contrast biodynamic category matters more to reviewers
than that of its organic counterpart.
What can we make of the negative effect of organic membership from
the non-blind tastings? The enormous divergence in the effects of organic
viticulture on estimates of quality in blind and non-blind tastings points to
a category-reputation effect. But this would not have an obvious basis from
our research. Recall that we found that the hazard of adopting biodynamics
was significantly higher for higher-quality/status wineries. But we did not
find that the hazard of adopting simple organic production was significantly
lower for the higher quality wineries. The effects of winery quality/status are
negative but very small and insignificant. If the pattern of findings about
membership and critical ratings reflects only a reputation effect, then we
would expect to find that the wineries that went organic were substantially
lower in initial quality, which we do not.
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Moreover, organic winemaking does not appear to have a negative valua-
tion in wine markets (see, for example, Asimov (2012)). In fact, it tends to
be regarded with favor in the wine world. Results from a consumer survey
indicated that the majority of American respondents who had tasted organic
wines had a positive opinion of their quality (Delmas and Grant, 2011). The
French government and the European Commission also explicitly favor the
use of organic practices and define them as “good for nature and good for
consumer” (European Commission, 2010). The Gault et Millau publication,
from which we culled our data, champions wines that are close to natural
as possible, and put organic in this group of “real” wines (in 2010 the ed-
itors published a guide focused on organic wineries). Finally, our analysis
controlled for fixed winery characteristics, including the durable aspects of
winery status. The effects we report are therefore largely cleansed of these
effects.
Nonetheless, some anecdotal evidence suggests that organic wines might
have initially gained a poor standing in the French market. Several organic
and biodynamic winemakers told us that they did not indicate their category
membership on labels because they did not want their wines to be sold in
wineshops that specialized in organic wines, because they judged that some of
the wines on offer in those shops were of low quality. The winemakers worried
about spillover effects of reputation. So perhaps we do see the consequences
of an initial low reputation for organic wines (at least in the French market).
If so, what does this mean for the interpretation of the greater positive
effect of biodynamic production in non-blind tastings as compare to blind
tastings? Is this evidence of a simple category-reputation effect that does
not depend on market signaling (the costs of membership being inverse to
quality)? If organic and biodynamic viticulture are roughly equally produc-
tive (as we see in results from the static analysis of WS ratings), the initial
differences in category reputations would tend to weaken over time. But our
estimates of the dynamic specification tell that the gap judged from blind
tastings is growing over time. Taking account of lagged ratings, biodynamic
wines—but not organic wines—improve significantly in quality over vintages.
This suggests that the strength of the market signal of biodynamic wines rel-
ative to organic ones is not fading, it is increasing. We view this pattern as
one that suggests that market signaling at the category level has been at
work.
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One possible explanation for the negative effect for organic viticulture
involves confidence beliefs. Agents typically make choices by focusing on the
strength of the available evidence (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). Membership
in the biodynamic category sends a strong signal, one consistent only with a
hypothesis of high quality. The signal has high diagnosticity. Membership in
the organic category as a signal lacks such strength because it is compatible
with multiple hypotheses, including low quality. Pragmatically, critics aim
to make judgments they will not regret. Then, the low diagnosticity of
this category membership can generate under-confidence in the evaluation
of offerings.
The surprising devaluation of organic wines by GM does not find a parallel
in prices on the U.S. retail market. Consumers can, of course, learn which
wines are organic and biodynamic (some list their category certifications on
labels, others indicate their practices on their webpages, and the American
wine press has extensive coverage of the move toward “natural” wines). And
importers and distributors can take these views into account in setting retail
prices. If organic wines have a poor reputation globally, then prices on the
American market ought to reflect this. Given that they do not, we surmise
that the initial poor reputation of organic wines was localized to the French
(or perhaps European) market.
We want to stress an important caveat. Our research design capitalizes on
the difference in method of evaluation of two sets of critics, one tasting blind
and the other knowing the identity of the producer at the time of tasting. We
attribute differences in patterns of association from the two critical sources
as reflecting only the difference in method. In other words, we rely on the
counterfactual that the two sets of critics would produce the same pattern of
association if they both used blind tastings. Of course we cannot evaluate the
plausibility of this counterfactual. Our study of the wine industry lead us to
think that the two sets of critics would react similarly to what are generally
regarded as defects in wine: off-aromas, excess acidity, lack of balance, and
so forth. But this does not mean that they would react similarly to the
wines that do not possess the obvious defects. Here differences in aesthetics
might come into play, and the critics might diverge. As we noted above, only
replications can tell whether the process we identify empirically is robust.
Processes involving concepts and categories have received much recent at-
tention in several branches of sociology. In studies of markets, sociologists
now conceptualize the dynamics of the interface of producers and audiences
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in these terms (Zuckerman, 1999). Work on institutional fields, organiza-
tional forms, product classification systems, and social movements have been
enriched by attention to categorical dynamics (for reviews, see DiMaggio
(1997); Benford and Snow (2000); Hannan (2010); Negro, Koçak, and Hsu
(2010)). This line of work shows that category boundaries are construed and
controlled by the perceptions of audience members and that category-based
processes have significant impact on market outcomes.
Our study on category signaling establishes three general connections to
this literature. First, the signals conveyed by category membership help
overcome information asymmetries that challenge the audience in screening
producers of different quality. Second, membership in categories with sharper
boundaries produces a more effective indicator of quality in the presence of
multiple signals. That is, holding constant prior quality, a high-contrast cat-
egory has a higher probability of emerging as a market signal. Apparently
unproductive actions indicating category membership do not affect the qual-
ity of a producer’s output. But, they can shape perceptions of the producers’
identities that signal quality, according to our interpretation. Third-party
certification agencies and critics, who often meet with producers one-on-one,
can monitor active participation and valid membership in this distinctive
category. Thus, the category membership itself can provide a monitoring
mechanism for the quality signal. Third, the histories of category mem-
bers link signals to quality when the audience observes actions not readily
understood as requiring high capability.
Treatments of signaling generally stress intentionality: producers want
to signal their quality and take actions accordingly. We do not make such
strong reliance on intentions. What matters is that audience members come
to associate quality with a practice that is hard to imitate for low-quality
producers. So we do not focus on why some producers and not others chose
to adopt biodynamic or organic viticulture, though that would be interesting
as a separate line of inquiry. For us, the action is on the audience side.
The examination of multiple dimensions of producer identities, individual
and collective, seems a fruitful avenue for future research. Another area to
explore concerns the link between the structure of market categories and
trust beliefs in the audience. Our findings suggest that category member-
ships can signal quality when other observables cannot. Categories with
sharp boundaries perhaps play a role in judging trustworthiness, even when
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the features that make a category distinctive are impractical and hard to de-
cipher and when exchanges are not based on personal relationships between
producers and audience members. We hope that our study provides ground
for new work on these questions.
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